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I. INTRODUCTION 
While a body of law has emerged in Washington that permits the 
courts to impose fees against a party or the party’s counsel as a sanction, 
that body of law has not been coherently examined in the academic set-
ting nor carefully and consistently analyzed in the case law.1  Sanctions 
can be imposed at any stage of the litigation.  For instance, sanctions 
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 1. Courts are generally not fond of battles between attorneys.  Accordingly, it is advisable that 
attorneys seek sanctions against opposing parties sparingly.  As the Washington Supreme Court 
warned in Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 356, 858 P.2d 
1054 (1993): 
The purposes of sanctions are to deter, to punish, to compensate and to educate.  Where 
compensation to litigants is appropriate, then sanctions should include a compensation 
award.  However, we caution that the sanctions rules are not “fee shifting” rules.  Fur-
thermore, requests for sanctions should not turn into satellite litigation or become a “cot-
tage industry” for lawyers. 
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may be imposed for filing a baseless lawsuit or defense,2 for filing a fri-
volous appeal,3 or for abusing the discovery process.4 
To compound the problem of a lack of rigor in the analysis of sanc-
tions, the law relating to the calculation of the appropriate fee to be im-
posed as a sanction is even less certain.  In Washington, the courts tend 
to favor the lodestar approach when calculating fee awards.  Under the 
lodestar methodology, the court must: (1) determine the reasonable num-
ber of hours expended to secure a successful recovery for the client; (2) 
determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s hourly rate; and then (3) 
multiply the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours 
incurred, retaining the discretion to adjust the amount upward or down-
ward as justice requires.5 
While the Washington Supreme Court has warned that the lodestar 
method is not applicable in every situation,6 Washington courts have in-
consistently applied the method in situations where a party or attorney is 
being sanctioned for misconduct, leading to confusion as to how fees 
should be calculated when sanctions are warranted.7  In the absence of 
some articulable standard for calculating fees as sanctions, courts may 
feel free to award insufficient or excessive fees unconnected to the actual 
expense imposed by the sanctionable conduct upon the opposing party or 
attorney. 
This Article explores and clarifies the principles underlying the im-
position of attorney fees as a sanction, providing an overview of the var-
ious ways in which attorneys can be sanctioned when they screw up.  
The Article discusses Washington law as it applies to sanctions and 
briefly analyzes how Washington courts look to comparable federal law 
for guidance.  Part II begins by analyzing Washington Civil Rule (CR) 
11, which prohibits baseless filings at the trial court level.  Part III turns 
to sanctions under RCW 4.84.185.  Part IV addresses sanctions under the 
                                                 
 2. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (2006). 
 3. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.9(a). 
 4. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 26(g).  In addition, a court has the inherent power to impose sanc-
tions for an abuse of the discovery process.  WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 37; WASH. REV. CODE § 
2.28.010(2)–(3) (2004).  See also State v. S.H., 102 Wash. App. 468, 473, 8 P.3d 1058 (2000) (not-
ing a court has the power to fashion and impose appropriate sanctions under its inherent authority 
even where such sanctions are not statutorily authorized); Wilson v. Henkle, 45 Wash. App. 162, 
174–75, 724 P.2d 1069 (1986) (recognizing the courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions 
against an attorney for inappropriate and improper conduct amounting to bad faith). 
 5. See Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wn.2d 526, 539, 210 P.3d 995 (2009); Mahler v. Szucs, 135 
Wash. 2d 398, 433–34, 957 P.2d 632 (1998). 
 6. See Brand v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 2d 659, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999) (declining 
to use the method in calculating worker compensation fee awards). 
 7. See, e.g., Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203 v. Racy, 149 Wash. App. 307, 314–316, 202 P.3d 
1024 (2009) (noting that the trial court was not mandated to follow the lodestar approach because its 
application was optional, but nevertheless analyzing the trial court’s decision under that method). 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure, and then Part V discusses sanctions re-
lated to the discovery process.  The Article concludes by arguing that 
much of the confusion surrounding the calculation of attorney fees as a 
sanction will be resolved by applying the lodestar method in all four 
areas of the law. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF CR 11 
CR 11 was adopted “to deter baseless filings and to curb abuses of 
the judicial system.”8  It applies to every pleading, written motion, and 
legal memorandum filed or served during the litigation.  CR 11 is not 
available, however, if another, more explicit court rule applies.9  The rule 
does not apply in appellate proceedings; instead, the appellate courts ap-
ply a similar standard under Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) Rule 
18.9(a).10 
CR 11 requires an attorney to sign pleadings, motions, or legal 
memoranda.  An attorney’s signature certifies that the attorney believes, 
after “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that the pleading, 
motion or legal memorandum is: (1) well grounded in fact; (2) warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; and (3) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unne-
cessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.11  Further-
more, the attorney’s signature certifies that “the denials of factual con-
tentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.”12  If an attorney 
signs a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum in violation of the rule, 
the court may impose an “appropriate sanction” against the attorney, the 
                                                 
 8. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 210, 219, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (noting the rule 
addresses two separate problems: baseless filings and filings made for an improper purpose).  For an 
excellent discussion of the early cases implementing CR 11 and the policy questions surrounding the 
rule, see Frederic C. Tausend and Lisa L. Johnsen, Current Status of Rule 11 in the Ninth Circuit and 
Washington State, 14 U. PUGET SOUND. L. REV. 419 (1991).  See also Peter Ramels, Factual Fri-
volity: Sanctioning Clients Under Rule 11, 65 WASH. L. REV. 939 (1990). 
 9. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 339–40, 858 P.2d 
1054 (1993); Biggs v. Vail (Biggs II), 124 Wash. 2d 193, 197, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). 
 10. 3 Karl B. Tegland, Wash. Prac. Series: Rules Practice at 445, 456 (6th ed. 2004) (noting the 
1994 amendments to RAP 18.7 make it clear that CR 11 no longer applies on appeal).  See also, 
Eugster v. City of Spokane, 139 Wash. App. 21, 34, 156 P.3d 912 (2007) (awarding attorney fees 
under RAP 18.9 for defending against a frivolous appeal).   
 11. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11(a). 
 12. Id. 
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represented person, or both.13  A court may impose sanctions pursuant to 
motion or on its own initiative.14 
The party moving for sanctions bears the burden to justify the re-
quest.15  In addition, the party seeking sanctions under CR 11 should no-
tify the offending party of the objectionable conduct and provide that 
person with an opportunity to mitigate the sanction by amending or 
withdrawing the paper.16  The counterpart federal rule provides a party 
with a twenty-one day safe harbor period during which the challenged 
pleading may be withdrawn.17 
Washington courts have developed criteria to determine whether 
the imposition of sanctions is appropriate.  In Miller v. Badgley,18 the 
court of appeals introduced a test to determine when a court may impose 
CR 11 sanctions.19  The court explained that sanctions under CR 11 may 
be imposed if any one of three conditions are met: (1) the attorney failed 
to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting the paper; (2) 
the attorney failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law to ensure 
that the pleading filed is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) 
the attorney filed the pleading for an improper purpose such as delay, 
harassment, or to increase the costs of litigation.20  In Blair v. GIM 
Corp.,21 the court of appeals further explained that a filing is baseless 
only if it is not well grounded in fact, or not warranted by existing law or 
a good faith argument for the alteration of existing law.22  These cases 
provide the necessary framework to determine whether the imposition of 
sanctions is appropriate. 
In 2005, the Washington Supreme Court amended CR 11.23  The 
amended rule permits attorneys to advance legal arguments seeking a 
good faith establishment of new law without risking sanctions.24  It also 
authorizes the imposition of sanctions for baseless denials of factual con-
                                                 
 13. CR 11 also requires a similar certification from an attorney helping to draft pleadings, 
motions, or other documents filed by otherwise self-represented persons; however, the attorney “may 
rely on the otherwise self-represented person’s representation of facts, unless the attorney has reason 
to believe that such representations are false or materially insufficient.”  WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 
11(b). 
 14. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11(a). 
 15. Biggs v. Vail (Biggs II), 124 Wash. 2d 193, 202, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). 
 16. Id. at 198 n.2. 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A). 
 18. 51 Wash. App. 285, 753 P.2d 530 (1988). 
 19. Id. at 300. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 88 Wash. App. 475, 945 P.2d 1149 (1997). 
 22. Id. at 482–83. 
 23. Amendment to WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11, 154 Wash. 2d 1114–15 (2005). 
 24. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11. 
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tentions, like those found in answers.25  These amendments make CR 11 
more closely parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11).  
Moreover, the rule now reflects the three conditions outlined in Miller.26  
Nonetheless, the courts remain divided over whether a finding that one of 
these conditions has been met is enough to satisfy the rule or whether a 
finding that all three conditions have been met is required before sanc-
tions can be imposed.27 
At a minimum, CR 11 requires attorneys to undertake a reasonable 
inquiry into the facts and the law before filing any pleading.  The rule 
“requires attorneys to stop, think, and investigate more carefully before 
serving and filing papers.”28  It was intended to deter the “shoot-first-
and-ask-questions-later” approach to the practice of law.29  The follow-
ing subsections examine aspects of the rule in greater detail. 
A. Attorneys Must Make a Reasonable Inquiry into the Law and the 
Facts 
While CR 11’s mandate is ongoing throughout the litigation,30 
sanctions are not appropriate merely because an action’s factual basis 
ultimately proves deficient or a party’s view of the law proves incor-
rect.31  Similarly, sanctions against an attorney are not warranted merely 
because the trier of fact found the attorney’s client not credible.32 
Because there are instances where the imposition of sanctions is in-
appropriate, courts must carefully evaluate whether an attorney’s inquiry 
into the law and the facts was reasonable.  Washington courts evaluate 
the reasonableness of the attorney’s pre-filing inquiry under the objective 
                                                 
 25. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11(a). 
 26. Compare WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11, with Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 300, 753 
P.2d 530 (1988). 
 27. In Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 300, 301–02, and McClure v. Tremaine, 77 Wash. App. 312, 
318, 890 P.2d 466 (1995), the courts concluded that a finding of one element is sufficient to impose 
sanctions.  On the other side, in Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wash. App. 106, 
110–11, 780 P.2d 853 (1989), and Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 910, 841 P.2d 1258 
(1992), the courts determined that all three elements must be established before imposing sanctions. 
 28. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 219, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983)). 
 29. Watson v. Maier, 64 Wash. App. 889, 898, 827 P.2d 311 (1992). 
 30. Doe, 55 Wash. App. at 114 (explaining that once reasonable inquiry reveals party should be 
dismissed, signature on subsequent pleadings in furtherance of claim is a violation of CR 11); Mac-
Donald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wash. App. 877, 888, 912 P.2d 1052 (1996) (finding a violation of CR 
11 where, after client’s deposition, attorney lacked factual basis for pursuing claim). 
 31. Roeber v. Dowty Aerospace Yakima, 116 Wash. App. 127, 142, 64 P.3d 691 (2003) (de-
termining that the failure to establish prima facie civil rights case did not equate with complete lack 
of factual basis). 
 32. Saldivar v. Momah, 145 Wash. App. 365, 403, 186 P.3d 1117 (2008), as amended (July 15, 
2008). 
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standard of “‘reasonableness under the circumstances.’”33  In making this 
determination, the courts may consider such factors as: 
[T]he time that was available to the signer, the extent of the attor-
ney’s reliance upon the client for factual support, whether a signing 
attorney accepted a case from another member of the bar or for-
warding attorney, the complexity of the factual and legal issues, and 
the need for discovery to develop factual circumstances underlying 
a claim.34 
In Cascade Brigade v. Economic Development Board for Tacoma-
Pierce County,35 the court of appeals mentioned additional factors to be 
considered when determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s pre-
filing inquiry: “The knowledge that reasonably could have been acquired 
at the time the pleading was filed, the type of claim and the difficulty of 
acquiring sufficient information, which party has access to the relevant 
facts, and the significance of the claim in the pleading as a whole.”36  
Relying on the client for the facts may not be sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of CR 11.37  Moreover, an attorney’s subjective belief about 
the veracity of the pleading is irrelevant.38 
B. Attorneys May Not File Pleadings for an Improper Purpose 
CR 11 sanctions are appropriate if the pleading is filed for an im-
proper purpose.  For example, in Suarez v. Newquist,39 the attorney at-
tempted to file multiple affidavits of prejudice.40  After the trial court 
rejected the affidavits, the attorney then attempted to file an affidavit of 
his own.41  After the trial judge rejected that affidavit, the attorney admit-
ted he was unprepared to argue the summary judgment motion.  Never-
theless, the trial court did not impose CR 11 sanctions.42  The court of 
appeals determined that the attorney misused the affidavits to improperly 
delay the proceeding, held that the trial court abused its discretion in not 
imposing sanctions, and remanded to the trial court to impose sanctions 
                                                 
 33. Bryant, 119 Wash. 2d at 220 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D 
165, 198 (1983)). 
 34. Id. at 220–21. 
 35. 61 Wash. App. 615, 811 P.2d 697 (1991). 
 36. Id. at 620 (citations omitted). 
 37. In re Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 854, 776 P.2d 695 (1989); Miller v. 
Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 302, 753 P.2d 530 (1988). 
 38. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 299–300.  See also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 
762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that an attorney’s subjective good faith no longer provides 
the safe harbor that it once did). 
 39. 70 Wash. App. 827, 855 P.2d 1200 (1993). 
 40. Id. at 834. 
 41. Id. at 835. 
 42. Id. 
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for the attorney’s violations of CR 11.43  Suarez’s significance should not 
be overlooked: the case permits the imposition of sanctions for an attor-
ney’s ill-motivated actions without regard to the three conditions enun-
ciated in Miller. 
Also instructive is Skilcraft Fiberglass, Inc. v. Boeing Co.,44 in 
which a supplier obtained, without notice, a default judgment against the 
primary contractor and the owner of the property where the construction 
project had taken place.45  The contractor and the property owner filed a 
motion to vacate the default judgment and to impose sanctions against 
the supplier.  The trial court granted the motion after concluding that the 
supplier’s attorney had obtained the default judgment against the proper-
ty owner improperly because the contractor’s bond had released the lien 
on the property.46  The court also concluded that the supplier’s attorney 
failed to serve the default motion on the contractor and the property 
owner, even though they were entitled to notice of the default proceed-
ings.47  The court awarded sanctions based on the attorney’s breach of his 
duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and the facts and his 
duty not to interpose the motion for purposes of delay or harassment or 
to increase the costs of litigation.48  The court of appeals affirmed the 
sanctions award after concluding that the attorney’s actions were inter-
posed for an improper purpose.49  As both Suarez and Skilcraft confirm, 
the “improper purpose” element is a separate and independent justifica-
tion for an award of sanctions under CR 11.50 
C. Courts May Impose Sanctions Against an Attorney, a Party, or Both 
If CR 11 is violated, a court may impose sanctions against the of-
fending attorney, a party, or both.51  As the Cascade Brigade court suc-
cinctly stated, “Starting a lawsuit is no trifling thing.  By the simple act 
                                                 
 43. Id.  The court also determined the attorney failed to satisfy his duty to make a reasonable 
pre-filing inquiry by relying solely on the clerk’s opinion when filing one of his affidavits of preju-
dice.  Id. at 834. 
 44. 72 Wash. App. 40, 863 P.2d 573 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Morin v. Burris, 
160 Wash. 2d 745, 756–57, 161 P.3d 956 (2007). 
 45. Id. at 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 44. 
 48. Id. at 44 n.1. 
 49. Id. at 47–48. 
 50. See Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 912–13, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992). 
 51. The issue of whether sanctions should be imposed against the attorney, the client, or both is 
troublesome.  CR 11 governs the conduct of an attorney in signing pleadings.  The determination of 
whether to file a lawsuit or submit a pleading is a practical decision that rests with the attorney.  
When the attorney has reservations about submitting a pleading, a discussion with the client about 
the meaning of CR 11 is essential. 
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of signing a pleading, an attorney sets in motion a chain of events that 
surely will hurt someone.  Because of CR 11, that someone may be the 
attorney.”52  Indeed, while CR 11 allows the imposition of penalties 
against both a party and the party’s attorney, the attorney usually bears 
the burden for violating the rule given the attorney’s heightened duty to 
the court.  The rule applies, however, with equal force to pro se parties.53 
In 1993, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the idea that sanc-
tions are mandatory by deleting the word “shall” from the language of 
the rule in favor of the more permissive “may.”54  Although the courts 
have substantial discretion when considering the imposition of sanctions 
under CR 11,55 some courts nevertheless continue to mistakenly assume 
sanctions are mandatory.56 
A court may look to the purpose behind CR 11 to determine wheth-
er to exercise its discretion under the circumstances and impose sanc-
tions.  For example, in Cascade Brigade, the court of appeals upheld the 
trial court’s imposition of sanctions after finding that an attorney 
representing Cascade Brigade had filed suit without “one fact to support 
[his] position,” and had “no basis in law for” the suit.57  The court held 
that the applicable law governing the suit was straight-forward and dis-
coverable with minimal research, that the attorney failed to produce any 
facts to support the suit, and that the attorney had learned of relevant 
contracts but never obtained or read them before starting the lawsuit.58  
In making this determination, the court focused on the policy behind CR 
11, which is to reduce the number of baseless lawsuits, and noted that the 
attorney’s “action in filing suit and moving for summary judgment with-
out facts typifies the shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later approach to the 
practice of law, an approach that CR 11 was intended to inhibit.”59  Un-
der these circumstances, the court determined that the trial court appro-
priately exercised its discretion to impose sanctions. 
                                                 
 52. Cascade Brigade v. Econ. Dev. Bd. For Tacoma-Pierce County, 61 Wash. App. 615, 617, 
811 P.2d 697 (1991). 
 53. Harrington, 67 Wash. App. at 910.  See also Brian L. Holtzclaw, Pro Se Litigants: Appli-
cation of a Single Objective Standard under FRCP 11 to Reduce Frivolous Litigation, 16 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 1371, 1371–72 (1993). 
 54. Amendment to WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11, 122 Wash. 2d 1102 (1993).  See also Rudolph 
v. Empirical Research Sys., Inc., 107 Wash. App. 861, 866, 28 P.3d 813 (2001) (noting that the 
Washington Supreme Court’s use of “shall” in a court rule creates a mandatory duty while “may” is 
permissive and discretionary). 
 55. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 303, 753 P.2d 530 (1988). 
 56. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 91 Wash. App. 127, 135, 955 P.2d 826 (1998). 
 57. 61 Wash. App. at 619–20. 
 58. Id. at 623–24. 
 59. Id. at 624. The court declined to use the word “frivolous” to describe the lawsuits that CR 
11 is designed to discourage because the word is not contained in the rule.  Id. at 626 n.8. 
2010] When Counsel Screws Up 445 
Given that the primary goal of CR 11 is to rid the courts of baseless 
litigation and to reduce the growing costs of litigation, it is unsurprising 
that courts almost always impose sanctions upon the attorney rather than 
on the attorney’s client.  “About half of the practice of a decent lawyer is 
telling would be clients that they are damned fools and should stop.”60  
The Watson court held that sanctions were properly imposed on an attor-
ney who brought suit against a physician without “a shred of evidence” 
that the physician was even present during the allegedly negligent sur-
gery.61  The court rejected the attorney’s argument that penalties should 
not be imposed on him because he was following a consulting firm’s ad-
vice in joining the physician, noting that CR 11 requires an attorney to 
make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting his case 
before filing a lawsuit.62  Blind reliance on the consulting firm’s advice, 
the court held, did not begin to satisfy the attorney’s CR 11 obligations.63  
Nor can an attorney rely on merely the client’s assurances that facts exist 
when a reasonable inquiry would reveal otherwise.64 
In addition to investigating the client’s version of the facts, an at-
torney must investigate the legal validity of all claims asserted.  In Mad-
den v. Foley,65 the trial court imposed CR 11 sanctions on the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff’s attorney, and the attorney’s law firm after determining that 
nearly all of the plaintiff’s claims were grounded in alienation of affec-
tion, a cause of action that no longer existed in Washington.66  The only 
challenge on appeal was to the imposition of sanctions against the attor-
ney and the firm; the court of appeals upheld the imposition of sanctions 
against both.67  The court held that the attorney failed to conduct a rea-
sonable investigation into whether the complaint had a proper foundation 
in law and fact and that the allegations indeed amounted to nothing more 
than a claim for alienation of affection.68  The court also upheld sanctions 
against the law firm because the attorney signed the pleadings as an 
agent of the firm.69  The court observed that the policies underlying CR 
11 are best served when the rule is interpreted broadly, enabling a court 
                                                 
 60. Watson v. Maier, 64 Wash. App. 889, 891, 827 P.2d 311 (1992) (quoting Elihu Root, the 
United States Secretary of State from 1905–1909, quoted in McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pac. 
Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 201–02 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
 61. Id. at 897. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 83 Wash. App. 385, 922 P.2d 1364 (1996). 
 66. Id. at 388. 
 67. Id. at 393. 
 68. Id. at 390–91. 
 69. Id. at 392. 
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to fashion a penalty that deters litigation abuses efficiently and effective-
ly.70 
In In re Cooke,71 on the other hand, the court of appeals upheld the 
imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff rather than the plaintiff’s 
attorney because the plaintiff used his attorney’s pleading papers.72  Not-
ably, the plaintiff signed the filing, not the attorney.73 
D. Determining the Appropriate Sanction 
Washington courts retain broad discretion to tailor an appropriate 
sanction and to determine against whom such a sanction should be im-
posed.74  Appellate courts will review the sanctions imposed under CR 
11 for an abuse of discretion, both as to the trial court’s decision to im-
pose sanctions and to the nature of the sanctions imposed.75 
Although the courts are ready and willing to impose sanctions un-
der CR 11 and its counterparts,76 “the least severe sanctions adequate to 
serve the purpose should be imposed.”77  In some instances, non-
monetary sanctions such as a reprimand may be sufficient.78  Notably, 
CR 11 sanctions are not designed to be another fee-shifting mechanism.79  
When the trial court awards attorney fees as a sanction, it must limit 
those fees to the amounts reasonably expended in responding to the im-
proper pleadings.80  Furthermore, “[a] party resisting a motion that vi-
olates CR 11 has a duty to mitigate and may not recover excessive ex-
penditures.”81 
The Washington Supreme Court’s treatment of sanctions in Biggs v. 
Vail is particularly instructive with respect to the complexities that may 
arise in CR 11 cases.82  Biggs began as a dispute over who should receive 
certain attorney fees earned by Patrick Biggs while employed as an at-
                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. 93 Wash. App. 526, 969 P.2d 127 (1999). 
 72. Id. at 527–28, 530. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 303, 753 P.2d 530 (1988). 
 75. State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 903, 969 P.2d 64 (1998) (apply-
ing abuse of discretion standard to the decision to award fees); Reid v. Dalton, 124 Wash. App. 113, 
125, 100 P.3d 349 (2004) (applying abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the amount of 
fees was appropriate). 
 76. In re Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 854–56, 776 P.2d 695 (1989). 
 77. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 225, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). 
 78. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 303. 
 79. Bryant, 19 Wash. 2d at 220. 
 80. MacDonald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wash. App. 877, 891, 912 P.2d 1052 (1996). 
 81. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 303. 
 82. Biggs v. Vail (Biggs I), 119 Wash. 2d 129, 830 P.2d 350 (1992); Biggs v. Vail (Biggs II), 
124 Wash. 2d 193, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). 
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torney by David Vail.83  Biggs sued Vail, alleging a myriad of claims, 
including breach of contract.84  The trial court found in favor of Vail on 
the breach of contract claim and determined that Biggs’s other claims 
were frivolous.  The court awarded Vail $25,000 in attorney fees.85  The 
court of appeals affirmed the judgment and awarded fees for a frivolous 
appeal.  The Washington Supreme Court reversed the fee award.86 
After the mandate was issued, Vail filed a motion in the trial court 
for sanctions under CR 11.87  The trial court granted the motion and 
awarded sanctions.  But it did not specify the conduct meriting the sanc-
tion and failed to explain the basis for reducing Vail’s claim.88  The 
Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded a second time, not-
ing that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when awarding the 
same amount of sanctions previously disallowed without further in-
quiry.89  Importantly, the court cautioned that reinstating the previous 
sanction a second time “regardless of its findings, would be presumptive-
ly unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.”90  The court concluded that 
a nonmonetary sanction was appropriate because Biggs was no longer 
practicing law.91  In the court’s view, his exit from the profession was 
enough to deter any future abuse.92 
E. Federal Law Provides Additional Guidance to Determine Appropriate 
Sanctions 
CR 11 shares many similarities with Rule 11.93  When the language 
of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the same, courts look 
                                                 
 83. Biggs I, 119 Wash. 2d at 131. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 132. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Biggs II, 124 Wash. 2d at 196. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 202. 
 90. Id. at 202 n.3. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 provides in part: 
(a)  Signature.  Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least 
one attorney of record . . . or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented . . . . 
(b)  Representations to the Court.  By presenting . . . a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, 
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, de-
fenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous ar-
gument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
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to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance.94  The federal rule 
reinforces the duty of candor by subjecting litigants who persist in litiga-
tion after it is no longer tenable to potential sanctions.95  Litigants in fed-
eral court may avoid the imposition of sanctions if they withdraw or cor-
rect contentions after a potential violation is called to their attention.96  
The imposition of a Rule 11 sanction constitutes a determination that an 
attorney has abused the judicial process rather than a judgment on the 
merits of an action.97  As with the state rule, federal courts look askance 
at the use of Rule 11 as a combative tool because the rules governing the 
ethical conduct of lawyers are too important to be trivialized and to be 
used in baseless mud-slinging.98 
Again mirroring the state rule, Rule 11 should not serve as a fee 
shifting mechanism to compensate the prevailing party; instead, courts 
must aim to deter and punish improper conduct.99  Courts must apply the 
rule so as to give effect to its principal goal of deterrence.100  Notwith-
standing its central purpose to deter vexatious litigation, the rule should 
not be construed as a bar to litigation; allegations need not be perfect 
                                                                                                             
discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. 
(c)  Sanctions. 
(1) In General.  If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an 
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule 
or is responsible for the violation.  Absent exceptional circumstances, a law 
firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, 
associate, or employee. 
. . . 
(4) Nature of a Sanction.  A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited 
to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated.  The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; 
an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted 
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or 
all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from 
the violation. 
. . . 
(d)  Inapplicability to Discovery.  This rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery 
requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37. 
 94. See, e.g., Am. Disc. Corp. v. Saratoga W., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 37–38, 499 P.2d 869 
(1972).  See also Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 221, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (construing 
CR 11 in light of FRCP 11 because the state rule is modeled after and is substantially similar to the 
federal rule). 
 95. Young v. Corbin, 889 F. Supp. 582, 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990). 
 98. Autrey v. United States, 889 F.2d 973, 986, reh’g denied 897 F.2d 537 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 99. United States ex rel. Leno v. Summit Constr. Co., 892 F.2d 788, 791 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 100. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393. 
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from the outset to avoid sanctions under the rule.101  Rule 11 allows at-
torneys to make claims as long as the allegations contained in them are 
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for fur-
ther investigation or discovery.  However, the rule does not give litigants 
general license to plead their claim first and investigate later.102  As with 
CR 11, the party who signs documents must conduct an inquiry into the 
facts and law in order to be satisfied that document is well grounded.103  
Under the federal rule, litigants are not free to sign frivolous or vexatious 
documents with impunity.104 
III.  RCW 4.84.185 
CR 11’s goal of deterring vexatious litigation is reinforced by RCW 
4.84.185.105  In enacting the statute,106 the legislature expressed concern 
about the baseless claims and defenses confronting the courts.107  It de-
signed the statute to discourage frivolous lawsuits and to compensate 
victims forced to litigate meritless cases.108  Unlike CR 11, the action 
must be frivolous in its entirety for the statute to apply.109  If any claim 
has merit, then the action is not frivolous under RCW 4.84.185.110  While 
the concept of “frivolity” may be amorphous, it is neither vague nor un-
constitutional.111  By contrast, CR 11 may apply to a single issue.112 
                                                 
 101. Foster v. Michelin Tire Corp., 108 F.R.D. 412, 415 (C.D. Ill. 1985). 
 102. Geisinger Med. Ctr. v. Gough, 160 F.R.D. 467, 469 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
 103. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 543–44 (1991). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Despite being created by different entities, WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11 and WASH. REV. 
CODE § 4.84.185 (2006) are virtually interchangeable. 
 106. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (2006) states, in pertinent part: 
In any civil action, the court . . . may, upon written findings by the judge that the action, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced 
without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the 
reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action . . . 
This determination shall be made upon motion by the prevailing party after a[n] . . . order 
of dismissal, order on summary judgment, final judgment after trial or other final order 
terminating the action as to the prevailing party.  The judge shall consider all evidence 
presented at the time of the motion to determine whether the position of the nonprevailing 
party was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause.  In no event may such mo-
tion be filed more than thirty days after entry of the order. 
 107. Biggs v. Vail (Biggs I), 119 Wash. 2d 129, 134–37 (1992) (reviewing and interpreting the 
legislative history of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (1991)). 
 108. Id. at 137. 
 109. State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 903–04, 969 P.2d 64 (1998); 
Biggs I, 119 Wash. 2d at 136; Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wash. App. 374, 85 P.3d 931 (2004). 
 110. In re Cooke, 93 Wash. App. 526, 530, 969 P.2d 127 (1999).  See also Biggs I, 119 Wash. 
2d at 137 (finding that although three of four claims were frivolous, the action as a whole could not 
be deemed frivolous). 
 111. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, Inc., 59 Wash. App. 332, 340, 798 P.2d 1155 (1990). 
 112. In re MacGibbon, 139 Wash. App. 496, 499, 161 P.3d 441 (2007). 
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The substantive standard for a frivolous action under the statute 
largely mirrors the standard articulated in CR 11.113  But unlike most CR 
11 sanctions, the client, not the attorney, pays the sanctions imposed un-
der RCW 4.84.185.114  If the issue in the case is “debatable” and there is 
a rational argument under the law and the facts to support it, fees must be 
denied.115  Similarly, issues of first impression are not frivolous.116  The 
decision whether to award attorney fees for a frivolous lawsuit is within 
the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent a clear show-
ing of abuse.117 
RCW 4.84.185 also has a parallel in federal law: 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  
While not directly analogous, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is also intended to deter 
attorneys or other persons from unreasonably and vexatiously multiply-
ing or extending the proceedings in a case by awarding costs, expenses, 
and attorney fees against them.118  An attorney’s harassing or annoying 
conduct need not be intentional or consciously improper for a court to 
impose sanctions; it is enough that the attorney displays a serious and 
studied disregard for the orderly administration of justice.119  Inartful 
pleading and ignorance of legal requirements do not amount to an inten-
tional abuse of the judicial process because an untenable claim is not im-
proper conduct.  Instead, evidence of recklessness, improper motive, or 
bad faith must be present.120  As with CR 11, federal courts apply an ob-
jective standard when determining whether to impose sanctions.121 
                                                 
 113. See Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 911–13, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992) (analyz-
ing claims under both the civil rule and the statute). 
 114. Biggs I, 119 Wash. 2d at 137; Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wash. App. 748, 756, 82 P.3d 707 
(2004); Watson v. Maier, 64 Wash. App. 889, 896, 827 P.2d 311 (1992). 
 115. Bill of Rights Legal Found. v. Evergreen State Coll., 44 Wash. App. 690, 696–97, 723 
P.2d 483 (1986). 
 116. Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 481, 488, 778 P.2d 534 (1989) (holding 
that a claim of obstruction of view as nuisance not frivolous as one of first impression).  Nor can 
issues of substantial public importance be said to be frivolous.  Moorman v. Walker, 54 Wash. App. 
461, 465–66, 773 P.2d 887 (1989) (holding that a claim of mother’s misrepresentation of inability to 
conceive to be novel and of substantial public importance, thus not frivolous). 
 117. Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash. 2d 614, 625, 724 P.2d 356 
(1986). 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) states: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States 
or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 
 119. Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 124 (D.R.I. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 120. Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1416–17 (5th Cir. 
1994); Murray v. Playmaker Servs., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d, No. 
08-12908, 2009 WL 1291769 (11th Cir. May 8, 2009); Gianna Enters. v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd., 
551 F. Supp. 1348, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 121. Amalong & Amalong, P.A. v. Denny’s Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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Because of the potential for abuse, federal courts122 construe the 
statute narrowly and with great caution.123  Federal courts utilize the sta-
tute only where there is evidence of serious disregard for the orderly ad-
ministration of justice.124  A court may impose sanctions under § 1927 on 
its own volition and at its own discretion.125  The statute permits a court 
to require an attorney to personally pay costs incurred due to his or her 
unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of legal proceedings.126  Costs 
assessed under the statute are limited to those excess costs arising out of 
the attorney’s vexatious behavior and subsequent complication or exten-
sion of the legal proceedings and may not amount to the total costs of 
litigation.127  The relative wealth of the parties may be considered in de-
termining the sanction imposed.128 
Despite the apparent similarity of § 1927 to Rule 11, the two rules 
have significant substantive and procedural differences and cannot be 
imposed as an alternative to one another.129  Section 1927 is broader in 
scope than Rule 11.  It is not triggered by the mere filing of frivolous 
claims; instead, it imposes a continuing restraint upon an attorney’s con-
duct throughout the course of the proceedings.130  A court may find cause 
to impose sanctions under Rule 11 while finding no cause to impose 
sanction under § 1927.131    
IV.  FRIVOLOUS APPEALS 
Washington appellate courts have awarded fees on appeal to parties 
who have abused the appellate rules or have filed frivolous appeals.132  
                                                 
 122. The federal statute is not limited to district courts; courts of appeals may likewise impose 
sanctions on an attorney for his or her unreasonable and vexatious conduct.  T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. 
Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 638 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 123. Mone v. Comm’r, 774 F.2d 570, 574 (2nd Cir. 1985). 
 124. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 125. Jolly Group, Ltd. v. Medline Indus., Inc., 435 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 126. United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 127. Rogers v. Kroger Co., 586 F. Supp. 597, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 
 128. Id. at 603. 
 129. Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 130. See In re Sowers, 97 B.R. 480, 484 (N.D. Ind. 1989). 
 131. In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
 132. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.9(a) states: 
The appellate court on its own initiative or on motion of a party may order a party or 
counsel, or a court reporter or other authorized person preparing a verbatim report of pro-
ceedings, who uses these rules for the purpose of delay, files a frivolous appeal, or fails to 
comply with these rules to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who 
has been harmed by the delay or the failure to comply or to pay sanctions to the court. 
See also WASH. R. APP. P. 18.7; WASH. R. APP. P. 18.9(a).  See generally WASHINGTON STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION, APPELLATE PRACTICE DESKBOOK, § 26.3 (Wash. State Bar Assoc. 3d ed. 2005); 
Philip A. Talmadge, Toward a Reduction of Washington Appellate Court Caseloads and More Effec-
tive Use of Appellate Court Resources, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 21, 34–37 (1985). 
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No cases discuss the particular method used to determine such fees under 
RAP 18.9(a); in practice, however, appellate court commissioners use the 
lodestar method.133 
In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, the courts have been 
guided since at least 1980 by the following considerations: 
(1) A civil appellant has a right to appeal under RAP 2.2; (2) all 
doubts should be resolved in favor of the appellant; (3) the record 
should be considered as a whole; (4) an appeal that is affirmed 
simply because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous; (5) an 
appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which rea-
sonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that 
there was no reasonable possibility of reversal.134 
More specifically, an appeal is frivolous if it is essentially factual rather 
than legal in nature, if it involves discretionary rulings and the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion, or if the appellant cannot cite any authority 
to support his or her position.135  An appeal is not frivolous simply be-
cause the appellant’s arguments were rejected.136  Similarly, an appeal is 
not frivolous if it involves an issue of first impression.137  A respondent 
may recover his or her fees on appeal from the party filing a frivolous 
appeal.138 
RAP 18.9(a) and RAP 18.7 both govern the imposition of sanctions 
on appeal.  RAP 18.9(a) permits an appellate court to impose sanctions 
where a party uses the rules to delay or for an improper purpose.  RAP 
18.7 specifically incorporates the provisions of CR 11, which suggests 
that a single frivolous appellate issue may be sanctionable.139  An appel-
                                                 
 133. Case law on this subject is largely confined to unpublished opinions in which the appel-
late courts, on finding an appeal to be frivolous, have directed a court commissioner to determine the 
amount of the award.  But see Lynn v. Labor Ready, Inc., 136 Wash. App. 295, 314, 151 P.3d 201 
(2006) (directing the court commissioner to determine reasonable attorney fees as a sanction under 
RAP 18.9(a) for making substantive misrepresentations to the court in a published decision). 
 134. Streater v. White, 26 Wash. App. 430, 435, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). 
 135. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 91 Wash. App. 127, 137–138, 955 P.2d 826 (1998) (finding 
no reasonable basis to argue the trial court abused its discretion); Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 
56 Wash. App. 125, 133, 783 P.2d 82 (1989) (finding an action to be frivolous where appellant 
failed to support his constitutional challenge with argument or authority, and his other claims were 
completely devoid of merit); Sherwood v. Bellevue Dodge, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 741, 750, 669 P.2d 
1258 (1983) (declining to award sanctions where the appeal was not purely factual). 
 136. Streater, 26 Wash. App. at 435. 
 137. Olson v. City of Bellevue, 93 Wash. App. 154, 165–66, 968 P.2d 894 (1998); Cary v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 78 Wash. App. 434, 440–41, 897 P.2d 409 (1995), aff’d, 130 Wash. 2d 335, 922 
P.2d 1335 (1996). 
 138. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Biggs, 100 Wash. 2d 9, 15, 665 P.2d 887 (1983); Boyles v. Dep’t 
of Ret. Sys., 105 Wash. 2d 499, 506, 716 P.2d 869 (1986). 
 139. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 223, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (“RAP 18.7 pro-
vides, however, that: ‘[e]ach paper filed pursuant to [the Rules of Appellate Procedure] should be 
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late court may also impose sanctions for a party’s recalcitrance or ob-
structionism.140  A party that files a series of groundless motions and ap-
peals may also face sanctions.141  A party appealing a trial court’s sanc-
tion decision may be deemed to be continuing such intransigence and 
face sanctions on appeal.142 
A respondent must comply with all of the requirements of 
RAP 18.1 relating to an award of attorney fees and expenses when re-
questing the imposition of sanctions against an appellant for the filing of 
a frivolous appeal.143  For example, RAP 18.1(b) requires the requesting 
party to devote a section of his or her opening brief to the request for 
fees.  Moreover, within ten days after a decision awarding the requesting 
party the right to a reasonable attorney fee is entered, that party must 
serve and file an affidavit detailing the expenses incurred and the servic-
es performed by counsel.144 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure likewise permit damages 
to compensate appellees forced to defend against frivolous appeals.145  
Under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38, an appeal is frivolous 
when it is litigated with no reasonable expectation of altering the district 
court’s judgment and is filed for purposes of delay or harassment or out 
of sheer obstinacy.146  Sanctions may be imposed on plaintiffs as well as 
their attorneys.147  Appellate Rule 38, to the extent it deals with questions 
of procedure, is controlling over provisions of state statutes in conflict 
with the rule.148  The decision to impose sanctions under Appellate Rule 
38 is discretionary.149 
                                                                                                             
dated and signed by an attorney or party as provided in CR 11. . . .’”); Layne v. Hyde, 54 Wash. 
App. 125, 136, 773 P.2d 83 (1989). 
 140. In re Adoption of B.T., 150 Wash. 2d 409, 421, 78 P.3d 634 (2003). 
 141. Rich v. Starczewski, 29 Wash. App. 244, 247–48, 628 P.2d 831 (1981). 
 142. Delany v. Canning, 84 Wash. App. 498, 501–02, 929 P.2d 475 (1997). 
 143. Cf. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 362 n.1, 762 P.2d 356 (1988) (finding 
sua sponte that the appeal was frivolous, but declining to award fees because respondent did not 
comply with RAP 8.1). 
 144. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.1(d). 
 145. Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3rd Cir. 1993).  If a court of appeals determines that 
an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court with reasonable 
opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.  FED. R. APP. 
P. 38. 
 146. Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 147. In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir. 1985); Nunley v. Comm’r, 
758 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 148. See Nordmeyer v. Sanzone, 315 F.2d 780, 781–82 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding that the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure trump the state statute that awards damages for delay on affirmance of 
money judgment). 
 149. In re George, 322 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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V.  DISCOVERY SANCTIONS 
A trend exists in Washington cases, anticipated in Fisons, for dis-
covery sanctions to serve as a cottage industry for the trial bar.150  Parties 
claiming discovery abuses can re-litigate their cases and recover all fees, 
even those incurred on seemingly unrelated matters.151  But the discovery 
rules are intended to “make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and 
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest 
practicable extent.”152  Washington courts require parties to be candid 
with one another in discovery.153  The Washington Supreme Court best 
articulated this policy in Fisons, noting that “a spirit of cooperation and 
forthrightness during the discovery process is necessary for the proper 
functioning of modern trials.”154 
To enforce the spirit of cooperation underlying the discovery rules, 
the court may impose sanctions for a party’s failure to cooperate.  Sanc-
tions for discovery-related misconduct may be imposed in three ways: 
(1) under CR 26(g), relating to the effect of certification of discovery 
answers; (2) under CR 37(b), relating to discovery sanctions for viola-
tions of court orders or violation of court rules; or (3) under the court’s 
inherent authority.155 
In cases where sanctions have been imposed, courts have ordinarily 
required egregious conduct by trial counsel.  For example, in Gammon v. 
Clark, the plaintiff’s counsel asked the manufacturer of a Bobcat loader 
that tipped over and killed the plaintiff’s husband to produce information 
during discovery regarding injuries arising out of the use of the same or 
similar equipment.156  The manufacturer initially provided five accident 
reports and produced fifty more following an order to compel produc-
tion.157  Once trial began, the manufacturer produced two boxes of addi-
tional reports that were revealed in a deposition.158  The court of appeals 
                                                 
 150. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 356, 858 P.2d 
1054 (1993). 
 151. See, e.g., Smith v. Behr Processing Corp., 113 Wash. App. 306, 323–325, 54 P.3d 665 
(2002); Mayer v. Sto Indust., Inc. (Mayer II), 156 Wash. 2d 677, 692–93, 132 P.3d 115 (2006); 
Magana v. Hyundai Motor Corp. of Am., 141 Wash. App. 495, 509, 170 P.3d 1165 (2007), review 
granted, 164 Wash. 2d 1020 (2008). 
 152. Gammon v. Clark Equip. Co., 38 Wash. App. 274, 279–80, 686 P.2d 1102 (1984) (quot-
ing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958)), aff’d on other grounds, 104 
Wash. 2d 613 (1985). 
 153. Id. at 281–82; Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 
343, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993); Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 39 Wash. App. 828, 835–36, 696 P.2d 28 
(1985). 
 154. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 342. 
 155. Id. at 339–40, 343. 
 156. Gammon, 38 Wash. App. at 277. 
 157. Id. at 277–78. 
 158. Id. at 279. 
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found a $2,500 sanction against the manufacturer inadequate to ensure 
that the manufacturer did not profit from its wrong and awarded a new 
trial.159 
Similarly, in Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., an aircraft manufacturer 
concealed the results of testing performed on an aircraft’s fuel systems 
despite subpoenas duces tecum requesting that information and an order 
directing it to comply with the subpoena.160  Nonetheless, the trial court 
found the manufacturer’s conduct reasonable and refused to grant the 
plaintiffs’ second motion for a new trial.161  The court of appeals disa-
greed, noting that it was not for the manufacturer to unilaterally decide 
what was relevant during discovery.162  The court granted the plaintiffs a 
new trial based on the manufacturer’s misconduct.163 
In Fisons, the Washington Supreme Court upheld sanctions against 
a pharmaceutical company that deliberately withheld two “smoking gun” 
letters from an injured plaintiff and her doctor.164  The letters revealed 
that the company had warned other selected physicians of the precise 
hazards of the drug that had caused the plaintiff’s injuries.165  The court 
stated that an attorney’s CR 26(g) discovery responses certification must 
be evaluated under an objective standard to assess if the attorney’s ac-
tions were reasonable: 
In determining whether an attorney has complied with the rule, the 
court should consider all of the surrounding circumstances, the im-
portance of the evidence to its proponent, and the ability of the op-
posing party to formulate a response or to comply with the re-
quest.166 
In finding the drug company’s conduct sanctionable, the court noted the 
company’s actions were “misleading,”167 and it “was persistent in its re-
sistance to discovery requests.”168 
                                                 
 159. Id. at 282. 
 160. 39 Wash. App. 828, 834–35, 696 P.2d 28 (1985). 
 161. Id. at 833, 835. 
 162. Id. at 836. 
 163. Id. at 838. 
 164. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 336, 858 P.2d 
1054 (1993).  The doctor and the plaintiff settled long before the documents were finally revealed in 
the course of the case between the physician and the company.  Id. at 307–08. 
 165. Id. at 307–08. 
 166. Id. at 343. 
 167. Id. at 352. 
 168. Id. at 346.  See generally Brian J. Beck, Rediscovering Discovery: Washington State 
Physicians Insurance Exchange and Association v. Fisons Corporation, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129 
(1994); Barbara J. Gorham, Fisons: Will it Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 
765 (1994); Bryan P. Harnetiaux et al., Harnessing Adversariness in Discovery Responses: A Pro-
posal for Measuring the Duty to Disclose After Physicians Insurance Exchange and Ass’n v. Fisons 
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In general, the sanction imposed for discovery abuse should be the 
least severe sanction available to adequately deter, punish, compensate, 
educate, and to ensure that the wrongdoer does not profit from the 
wrong.169  Due process issues may arise, especially where a party is de-
prived of his or her day in court due to the misconduct of the party’s 
counsel during discovery.  The court’s decision in Smith v. Behr 
Processing Corporation is instructive.  In Smith, the trial court imposed 
sanctions against Behr Processing for violating an order requiring wit-
ness disclosure.170  In particular, Behr failed to disclose the opinions of 
certain experts and to deliver product tests revealing defects in its prod-
uct.171  After an extensive evidentiary hearing on the violation, the trial 
court made the requisite findings and ordered a default judgment pur-
suant to CR 55.172  The court of appeals affirmed, finding the sanction 
did not violate Behr’s right to due process.173 
A trial court must make a record of its sanctions decision, which an 
appellate court will ordinarily review for an abuse of discretion.174  In 
Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance,175 the Washington Supreme Court out-
lined several factors to be considered when determining whether a trial 
court adequately considered lesser sanctions (e.g., excluding evidence or 
testimony, dismissing the case, or entering an order of default) when se-
verely sanctioning a party.  Rivers v. Washington State Conference of 
Mason Contractors176 synthesized these factors into a three-part test: 
When a trial court imposes dismissal or default in a proceeding as a 
sanction for violation of a discovery order, it must be apparent from 
the record that (1) the party’s refusal to obey the discovery order 
was willful or deliberate, (2) the party’s actions substantially preju-
diced the opponent’s ability to prepare for trial, and (3) the trial 
court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would proba-
bly have sufficed.177 
The Burnet court reversed the trial court’s harsh sanction because it 
failed to consider lesser sanctions,178 while the Rivers court remanded the 
                                                                                                             
Corporation, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 499 (1994).  See also In re Firestorm, 129 Wash. 2d 130, 139, 916 
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 173. Id. at 330–31. 
 174. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 339, 355. 
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case and required the trial court to make specific findings on the record 
related to all three parts of the test.179 
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court appeared to unders-
core in the strongest way the imperative of forthrightness and coopera-
tion during discovery.180  The court upheld an $8,000,000 default judg-
ment against a manufacturer for what it described as the manufacturer’s 
“atrocious behavior in failing to respond to discovery requests through-
out the lawsuit.” 181  Declaring that trial courts “need not tolerate delibe-
rate and willful discovery abuse,” the court held the trial court had prop-
erly applied the Burnet factors in imposing one of the “harsher remedies” 
under CR 37(b).182  Noting that Hyundai is a sophisticated multinational 
corporation, experienced in litigation, the court held that the company 
had willfully, deliberately, and continually failed to comply with Ma-
gaña’s discovery requests.183  It further held that Hyundai’s “egregious 
actions” during discovery prejudiced Magaña’s ability to prepare for tri-
al.184  The court upheld the trial court’s finding that a monetary fine 
would not suffice as it was difficult to know what amount would be suit-
able to impose against a multi-billion dollar corporation.185  It also 
upheld the trial court’s decision not to grant a continuance so as not to 
reward the party who had committed the discovery violations.186  While 
the court’s upholding of such an extraordinarily severe discovery sanc-
tion may raise questions about due process, it should put practitioners on 
notice that the court will not take lightly its admonition in Fisons to en-
gage forthrightly in the discovery process.  It should certainly give any 
attorney pause who might otherwise contemplate shielding discoverable 
material from opposing counsel.  The cost of doing so could prove fatal 
to one’s case. 
In Mayer v. Sto Industries, Inc.,187 the court of appeals held that 
when a trial court imposes substantial monetary sanctions against a party 
for discovery-related violations, the trial court must comply with Burnet 
and Rivers.188  There, the court of appeals ordered a new trial after Sto 
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failed to disclose a document in discovery but gave the plaintiffs access 
to a corporate document repository.189  In the second trial, the trial court 
imposed the attorney fees and expenses that the plaintiffs incurred in the 
first trial as a discovery sanction without specifying the rule or other ba-
sis for the sanction.190  The court of appeals remanded, holding that the 
lodestar multiplier may be applied only to fees after the contingent fee is 
effective, not to the entire fee award.191  The Washington Supreme Court 
reversed the court of appeals, however, holding that the Burnet-Rivers 
protocol was inapplicable in the context of a compensatory award under 
CR 26 because those factors applied to the harsher remedies such as dis-
missal, default, and exclusion of testimony allowable under CR 37(b).192  
The reluctance to employ the lodestar method when calculating attorney 
fees as a sanction is problematic, and will be discussed in Part VI, infra. 
The Washington discovery rules have their counterparts in Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and 37.  Under those rules, a court may 
direct a party to pay the opposing party’s reasonable attorney fees and 
costs where the opposing party is forced to expend unnecessary time and 
expense due to the offending party’s failure to respond to discovery re-
quests.193  Similarly, a court may require a party to pay reasonable ex-
penses and fees incurred due to bad faith claims regarding discovery ma-
terials.194  An attorney must make a reasonable inquiry before certifying 
discovery documents are complete or correct, or the attorney risks the 
imposition of discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26.195 
Attorneys and clients alike may be held responsible for fees and 
costs imposed as a sanction for discovery abuse.196  Furthermore, an at-
torney may be held personally liable for failing to comply with discovery 
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orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.197  Sanctions against 
counsel are a more appropriate remedy than dismissal of the client’s ac-
tion where discovery violations are the result of counsel’s neglect.198  
Sanctions may, however, be imposed against a client rather than the at-
torney where it is unclear that it was the attorney, rather than the client, 
who instigated the discovery violation.199 
A court must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard on the 
record before imposing sanction of attorney fees for discovery viola-
tions.200 
In determining the amount of attorney fees and costs to award as a 
discovery sanction, the court may consider, inter alia: the skill and expe-
rience of the attorney; the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions 
involved, and the skill required in addressing them; and the preclusion of 
other employment.201  The court may also consider the length of time an 
attorney has been in practice and the attorney’s relative experience in a 
given field of practice.202 
VI.  THE APPROPRIATE RULE FOR CALCULATING ATTORNEY FEES AS 
SANCTIONS 
Because the lodestar method is the default principle for calculating 
reasonable fees in Washington, a court that chooses to award attorney 
fees as a sanction should calculate the fee using that method.203  Uniform 
application of the lodestar method will (1) ensure an objective standard 
of reasonableness; (2) discourage attorneys from abusing sanctions mo-
tions; and (3) ensure that the trial courts establish sound support for the 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the purposes underlying the rules. 
The Washington Supreme Court summarized the rules relating to 
the calculation of a reasonable attorney fee in Mahler v. Szucs:204 
Under the lodestar methodology, a court must first determine that 
counsel expended a reasonable number of hours in securing a suc-
cessful recovery for the client.  Necessarily, this decision requires 
the court to exclude from the requested hours any wasteful or dup-
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licative hours and any hours pertaining to unsuccessful theories or 
claims.  Counsel must provide contemporaneous records of docu-
menting the hours worked . . . .  [S]uch documentation need not be 
exhaustive or in minute detail, but must inform the court, in addition 
to the number of hours worked, of the type of work performed, and 
the category of attorney who performed the work (i.e., senior part-
ner, associate, etc.). 
The court must also determine the reasonableness of the hourly rate 
of counsel at the time the lawyer actually billed the client for ser-
vices. 
Finally, the lodestar fee, calculated by multiplying the reasonable 
hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours incurred in obtaining 
the successful result, may, in rare instances, be adjusted upward or 
downward in the trial court’s discretion.205 
Although Washington courts generally recognize the lodestar method as 
the default principle for calculating a reasonable attorney fee, Washing-
ton courts have on occasion determined the lodestar method does not or 
may not apply.206 
Until the Washington Supreme Court’s Mahler decision, most ob-
servers assumed that the lodestar methodology applied to calculate the 
fee imposed as a sanction for discovery misconduct, particularly because 
federal courts employed the same method.207  Presumptively, that same 
method would govern the calculation of a reasonable fee under CR 11 or 
RCW 4.84.185.208  However, in Highland School District No. 203 v. 
Racy,209 the court of appeals declined to apply the lodestar method to 
calculate a sanction under the statute; although it analyzed the trial 
court’s fee award under that methodology, the court concluded that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its fee award.210  The 
Racy court, however, was affected by the fact that counsel for the party 
seeking fees agreed to charge the client a low hourly rate, and the trial 
court adopted the rate as the basis for its fee award.211  Under the proper 
lodestar calculation, the actual, not the theoretical, hourly rate should be 
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applied in any event and adjusted upward or downward after the lodestar 
is calculated.212 
The lodestar methodology is a well-developed means of requiring a 
court to “show its work.”213  It must identify which hours, for example, 
were spent by the attorneys to achieve a favorable result.  This prevents 
counsel from claiming excessive or unnecessary time as part of a discov-
ery sanction.214  For Washington courts to simply impose whatever fee 
award they choose without a methodology to establish that the fee is rea-
sonable departs from the wise mandate that sanctions should not be con-
fused with fee-shifting statutes; rather, sanctions should represent the 
amounts reasonably expended to respond to the improper conduct. 
The appropriate rule for calculating a reasonable attorney fee in a 
CR 11, RCW 4.84.185, frivolous appeal, or discovery sanction case 
should be the lodestar method. 
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